By Arun Anand-
This is the 10th part of the ‘Taliban Story’, a 30-part series that we bring to our readers. The feedback can be shared at contact@thenationalistview.com. Here is the 10th part-
The Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan after 2001 cannot be completely understood without underlining the role of Al Qaeda in the region. Contrary to views which consider the two as separate entities with widely different ideologies and goals, there is sufficient evidence which proves the claim otherwise. In the following sections, we provide insights into the Taliban – Al Qaeda association, from the time they were established to the post-Doha Declaration period.
The Doha Agreement, also known as the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, is a peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on February 29, 2020. The four-page agreement was signed at Doha, Qatarzad. The Agreement provided for the withdrawal of all NATO forces from Afghanistan in return for a Taliban pledge to prevent al-Qaeda from operating in areas under Taliban control. However, this is most unlikely to happen.
A look into their association will reflect upon the future course of events in Afghanistan and provide evidence that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are indeed two sides of the same coin with the common telos of global Islamic radicalisation.
A detailed research paper by India based think tank Centre for Integrated and Holistic Studies in August 2021 analysed the connect between Al Qaeda and Taliban in detail. Excerpts from this research paper are being reproduced here.
Osama bin Laden[1] was born to a billionaire construction magnate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and one of his ten wives, Hamida, in 1957. She and her son, bin Laden were ostracized from their family and were labelled as Al Abeda and Ibn Al Abeda, that is, the slave, and the son of the slave. Being the only child of his mother, he was given a fair share in his father’s estate. By the time bin Laden turned 17, he had inherited $57 million from his father’s businesses[2].
At university, bin Laden met his mentor, Abdullah Azzam, a radical Islamist of Palestinian descent. He shaped bin Laden’s political ideology and encouraged him to partake in the ongoing Afghan-Soviet conflict[3]. Azzam played a key role in directing bin Laden in the need to bring Muslims all around the world together to wade off the godless Russians. In 1984, along with Azzam, bin Laden founded the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK)4, a jihadist organisation to recruit young Muslim men all over the globe to fight the Soviet Russians. After thousands joined from Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, bin Laden moved with his fighters to Afghanistan and started building medical facilities using his own wealth to support the ongoing Mujahideen movement there. Geneva Accords[4], which were signed between Soviet Russia and Afghanistan to end the former’s forced occupation, was a landmark moment in advancing bin Laden’s leadership acumen.
Following an ideological split with Azzam, bin Laden along with Ayman al-Zawahiri[5] founded Al Qaeda (The Base) in Pakistan in 1988. At the core, bin Laden wanted to continue jihad worldwide, uniting all Muslims and waging armed wars against the triad which had brutally suppressed Muslims. The triad consisted of the apostate Arabs, the Israelis, and the United States. The primary reason for enmity towards the triad was their perceived suppression of Islam. The Arabs had not fully embraced Islam, the Zionists were engaged in massacres of innocent Muslims in Palestine, and the United States, which had pumped billions of dollars in West Asia had corrupted Islamic leadership in the region3.
Al Qaeda’s long-term objective is to bring change in global societies by governing them through strict sharia laws. Their strategy is to gradually provide religious education to Muslims all over the world, then familiarize them with the idea of jihad, and later encourage them to wage violent wars as the only method of emancipation. It’s threat to the world can be understood as:
The genesis of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and their modus operandi are indicative of their similarities. A close review of the association between Mullah Omar and his counterpart Osama bin Laden further evinces the underlying claim of this analysis that the terror groups are indeed two sides of the same coin:
When asked about the terror activities which were emanating from the Afghan soil by bin Laden, Omar’s response could be viewed as one to safeguard his counterpart and also to speak for the greater idea of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. All through the conversation, Omar’s undertone is to protect and strengthen Islamic solidarity. An excerpt from the conversation is shown in Fig.3.
“This heavy slap on their dark faces was the consequence of their interventionist policies and not our doing.”
The 9/11 Commission report states that the two shared ties since 1980s, when Al Qaeda began engagement with the Haqqani Network, which is a vital part of the Taliban’s existence. With the assistance of Pakistan’s ISI, bin Laden was networked with Taliban leaders in Kandahar, the primary base of all ISI’s power and influence[21]. This aided bin Laden to regain control over camps in Khowst and he was able to expand training to Kashmiri militants. This cemented the ties between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. By the virtue of this relationship, bin Laden was able to evade limitations placed on his speech in the country and allowed him free movement in Afghanistan.
As per the report, Mullah Omar would second bin Laden in his ideology and actions even if the other members of the Taliban were against it. As per the report, Afghanistan worked as a safe haven for Al Qaeda and played a crucial role in planning and execution of the attacks. Matters like unrestricted cross-border travel without legitimate immigration, use of official Afghan defense vehicles, and unauthorized use of Afghan national airlines to send and receive shipments of money was prevalent before the attacks. Indeed, it can be concluded that Afghanistan had become a breeding ground for terrorists. Training camps which were run by Al Qaeda not just served a role in 9/11 attacks but were used to organize, plan, and deploy terror activities in other parts of the world as well. Even after decades of negotiations, the Taliban has never come clean about its ties with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
As per the 12th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations Security Council[22], a deep-rooted relationship exists between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The report which was submitted in 2020 presents the following key points:
A report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in June 2020[24] has also stated the strengthening association between the two. The following points evince the affiliation between Al Qaeda and the Taliban:
Just as Al Qaeda is active in Afghanistan and has functional and social ties with the Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[25] is active on Pakistani soil and has maintained close relations with Al Qaeda. Reportage from the U.S. National Counterterrorism Centre states that the objective[26] of the TTP is to overthrow the government in Pakistan, establish a caliphate there, and to expel the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan. Leaders of both, the Taliban, Mullah Omar and Al Qaeda, Laden, urged chief commanders of the TTP to assist them in reducing U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
As the Taliban looks forward to impose its will and influence in Afghanistan, it is crucial to understand the other power-stakeholders in the scenario. The following conclusions can be drawn from after analysing the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban:
The opinion that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are two distinct entities with different goals is not convincing. There is ample evidence which proves that these terror outfits not just originated to serve an identical purpose but continue to do so. The Declaration which seeks removal of Al Qaeda and its affiliates from Afghani soil is yet to bear fruition, and unfortunately, with the Taliban’s history of spreading lies about Al Qaeda’s presence in the country, it is a glaring reality that these two will continue to work in cohesion.
(fas.org, 2021). “Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy: In Brief”, June 2011 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45122.pdf> accessed 21 July 2021
‘AL QAEDA, THE TALIBAN, AND OTHER EXTREMISTS’ GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN’ (govinfo.gov, 2021) <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67892/html/CHRG-112shrg67892.htm> accessed 21 July 2021
Osama bin Laden, Roland Jacquard, 2007. “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places/In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood”, On Violence: A Reader, Bruce B. Lawrence, Aisha Karim
‘MMP: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’ (cisac.fsi.stanford.edu, 2021) <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan#_ftn28> accessed 21 July 2021
‘Methods And Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism’ (ojp.gov, 2005) <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211207.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[1] ‘Hamza Usama Muhammad Bin Laden | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/hamza-usama-muhammad-bin-laden> accessed 25 July 2021
[2] (Post, J., fas.org, 2002). “Killing in the name of God: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda”, USAF Counterproliferation Centre, <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/post.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[3] ‘View Of “Jihad And The Rifle Alone”: ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam And The Islamist Revolution | Journal Of Conflict Studies’ (journals.lib.unb.ca, 2003) <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/219/377> accessed 25 July 2021
[4] ‘UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission In Afghanistan And Pakistan – Background’ (peacekeeping.un.org) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/ungomap/background.html> accessed 25 July 2021
[5] ‘AIMAN MUHAMMED RABI AL-ZAWAHIRI | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/aiman-muhammed-rabi-al-zawahiri> accessed 21 July 2021
[6] Crenshaw, M., (usip.org, 2020), “Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach”, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_158-rethinking_transnational_terrorism_an_integrated_approach.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[7] ‘- THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL-QAEDA’ (govinfo.gov, 2001) <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg77601/html/CHRG-107shrg77601.htm> accessed 25 July 2021
[8] ‘Combating Al Qaeda And The Militant Islamic Threat’ (rand.org, 2006) <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[9] ‘- TERRORIST FINANCING SINCE 9/11: ASSESSING AN EVOLVING AL-QAEDA AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM’ (govinfo.gov, 2012) <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg78153/html/CHRG-112hhrg78153.htm> accessed 25 July 2021
[10] Comras V, ‘Al Qaeda Finances And Funding To Affiliated Groups’ (Hsdl.org, 2005) <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=453828> accessed 25 July 2021
[11] Bergen P, and Tiedemann K, Talibanistan (Oxford University Press 2013)
[12] ‘Statement By The Committee On Usama Bin Laden | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/docs/statement-on-usama-bin-laden> accessed 21 July 2021
[13] ‘MOHAMMED OMAR | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1988/materials/summaries/individual/mohammed-omar> accessed 21 July 2021
[14] (2001) <https://www.dia.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Electronic-Reading-Room/FOIA-Reading-Room-Afghanistan/FileId/64730/> accessed 25 July 2021
[15] ‘Terror Tuesday: Impact On South Asia — Mullah Mohammed Omar-Profile’ (satp.org, 2001) <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/mullah_moh.htm> accessed 25 July 2021
[16] Roggio B, ‘Taliban Lauds Mullah Omar For Defending Osama Bin Laden After 9/11 | FDD’s Long War Journal’ (FDD’s Long War Journal, 2020) <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/04/taliban-lauds-mullah-omar-for-defending-osama-bin-laden-after-9-11.php> accessed 25 July 2021
[17] ‘Taliban’s Mullah Omar 8/22 Contact with State Department’ (nsarchive2.gwu.edu, 2008) <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc%202.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[18] Bakshian D, ‘AFGHAN BIN LADEN’ (fas.org, 1998) <https://fas.org/irp/news/1998/08/980819-bomb1.htm> accessed 25 July 2021
[19] Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Taliban justifies 9/11 attack, blaming America’s ‘interventionist policies’,” FDD’s Long War Journal, July 23, 2019. (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/07/taliban-justifies-9-11- attack-blaming-americas-interventionist-policies.php)
[20] (govinfo.gov, 2021). “The 9/11 Commission Report”. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf> accessed 21 July 2021
[21] Joscelyn T, ‘The Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Policy’ (congress.gov, 2019) <https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109992/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-JoscelynT-20190919.pdf> accessed 25 July 2021
[22] (undocs.org, 2021). “Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan” <https://www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2021/486> accessed 21 July 2021
[23] ‘AIMAN MUHAMMED RABI AL-ZAWAHIRI | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/aiman-muhammed-rabi-al-zawahiri> accessed 21 July 2021
[24] (fas.org, 2021). “Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan” <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10604.pdf> accessed 21 July 2021
[25] ‘TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP) | United Nations Security Council’ (un.org, 2021) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-%28ttp%29> accessed 21 July 2021
[26] ‘National Counterterrorism Centre | Groups’ (dni.gov, 2021) <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/ttp.html> accessed 21 July 2021